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“Help Is the Sunny Side of Control”:  
The Medical Model of Gambling and 
Social Context Evidence in Canadian 
Personal Bankruptcy Law1
ANNA J. LUND*
At the start of the twentieth century, people who gambled excessively were viewed as morally 
deviant. Now, they are viewed as suffering from a medical disorder. Legal actors incorporate 
this medical approach to gamblers into how they apply the law. This shift from a moral to a 
medical model reorients actors from punishing gamblers to helping them, and thus can be 
characterized as a positive, humane development. Yet the medical model has drawbacks too. 
The medical model can be used to justify paternalistic and potentially harmful interventions 
in the lives of individuals, and it obscures the social context in which individuals’ behaviour 
occurs.
* Assistant Professor, University of Alberta. The author wishes to thank Fiona Nicoll, Ubaka 
Ogbogu, Garry Smith, Gail Henderson and the participants at Emory University’s workshop 
on “Legal Transitions and the Vulnerable Subject” for their helpful feedback on earlier 
drafts of this article, and Arooj Shah, Isis Tse and David Adie for their valuable research and 
editorial support. 
1. The title of this article is taken from Anne Lamott, “12 Truths I Learned from Life and 
Writing” (April 2017), online: Ted2017 <www.ted.com/talks/anne_lamott_12_truths_i_
learned_from_life_and_writing/transcript>. In her TED Talk, Lamott reflects on twelve 
things that she believes to be true. The third item on her list relates to our limited ability 
to help other people. Lamott says, “we can’t arrange peace or lasting improvement for the 
people we love most in the world. They have to find their own ways, their own answers. 
… You have to release them. It’s disrespectful not to. And if it’s someone else’s problem, you 
probably don’t have the answer, anyway. Our help is usually not very helpful. Our help is 
often toxic. And help is the sunny side of control. Stop helping so much.”
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The drawbacks of the medical model can be illustrated with the example of gamblers who 
undergo personal bankruptcy proceedings. Many of the legal actors practicing bankruptcy 
law have adopted a medical approach to gamblers. They have reoriented their practices to 
serve therapeutic ends. Yet, they may be inadvertently harming the bankrupts they are trying 
to help. 
The risk of harms created by the medical model can be mitigated by educating legal actors 
about the social context in which gambling occurs. This article synthesizes research on 
the social context of gambling in Canada and illustrates how it can inform the practices of 
legal actors who implement Canadian personal bankruptcy law. The example of Canadian 
personal bankruptcy law underlines the importance of incorporating social context evidence 
into the practice law, especially when a legal issue has been medicalized.
BETWEEN 1 AND 6 PER CENT of Canadians have a gambling disorder.2 For 
many people, excessive gambling leads to excessive gambling debt.3 Once an 
individual’s gambling losses exceed their income and savings, the individual may 
fund their play with credit—advances on credit cards or lines of credit, money 
borrowed from friends or family, cash raised by purchasing items on store credit 
2. See Alberta Gambling Research Institute, “Prevalence – Canada Provincial Studies” (last 
modified 17 June 2016), online: Alberta Gambling Research Institute <abgamblinginstitute.ca/
resources/reference-sources/prevalence-canada-provincial-studies>.
3. See e.g., Carolyn Downs & Ryan Woolrych, “Gambling and Debt: The Hidden Impacts 
on Family and Work Life” (2010) 13 Community, Work & Family 311 at 315; Carolyn 
Downs & Ryan Woolrych, Gambling and Debt Pathfinder Study (Manchester Metropolitan 
University, 2009); Erika Langham et al, “Understanding Gambling Related Harm: 
A Proposed Definition, Conceptual Framework & Taxonomy of Harms” (2016) 16 BMC 
Public Health 1 at 6. 
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and immediately reselling them at a discounted price.4 These gambling-related 
debts may become unmanageable, and the individual may turn to the debt relief 
options available in Canada’s personal insolvency system, including bankruptcy. 
Research on Canadian gamblers suggests that they declare bankruptcy at a 
disproportionate rate compared to non-gamblers.5 Research on Canadian 
bankrupts suggests that gambling is an underreported, yet significant cause of 
financial distress.6 Researchers estimate that gambling plays a role in anywhere 
from 1 to 20 per cent of Canadian bankruptcies.7
Bankruptcy aims to provide indebted individuals with a financial fresh 
start by releasing their debts, but the legislation that governs Canadian personal 
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, restricts gamblers from accessing 
debt relief. This punitive provision dates back to 1919—a time when most forms 
4. In a study of how gamblers use credit, the researchers found that they move from those 
sources of credit that are most liquid and invisible to their friends and family (e.g., their 
salary, lump sum payments) towards those sources that are more illiquid and visible (e.g., 
funds in joint accounts, pawning property, borrowing from friends and family). See Michael 
O’Neil, Nicola Chandler & Anthony Kosturjak, Problem Gamblers and the Role of the 
Financial Sector (The South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, 2010).
5. In a study of Alberta gamblers, the researchers estimated that approximately 1,950 problem 
gamblers declare bankruptcy annually, and that 10-20 per cent of bankruptcies in the 
province are attributable to excessive gambling. See Robert Williams, Yale Belanger & 
Jennifer Arthur, “Gambling in Alberta: History, Current Status and Socio Economic Impact” 
in Final Report to the Alberta Gaming Research Institute (2011) at 178, 181.
6. In a study of seniors in insolvency, Janis Sarra found that in 2.44 per cent of cases, 
individuals identified gambling as the primary cause of their bankruptcy in their paperwork, 
but that number increased to 8 per cent of cases when bankrupts were interviewed by 
telephone. See Janis Sarra, “Growing Old Gracefully: An Empirical Investigation into 
Elderly Bankrupt Canadians” in Janis Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2006 
(Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2007) 783 at 807, 810. In a survey of 521 Canadians 
who started insolvency proceedings between 1 August 2008 and 1 July 2010, 4.2 per 
cent cited gambling as a contributing cause to their financial difficulty. See David U 
Himmelstein et al, “Health Issues and Health Care Expenses in Canadian Bankruptcies and 
Insolvencies” (2014) 44 Intl J Health Services 7 at 12. Andrew Diamond, a judicial officer 
from Ontario, reports that gambling is cited as a cause of financial distress by 5 per cent of 
the people appearing in bankruptcy court in Toronto. See Andrew M. Diamond, “What to 
do with a Drunken Sailor and Other Bankrupts with Additions or What Are Appropriate 
Conditions to Impose on the Discharges for Bankrupts Suffering from Addiction and Mental 
Illness? Section 173 Voluntary vs. Involuntary” (2008) 36 CBR (5th) 167 at 170-71. 
7. See Anna J Lund, “Gambling Debt in Personal Insolvency Proceedings: The Approach of 
Insolvency Trustees and Judicial Officers” in Janis Sarra & Hon Barbara Romaine, eds, 
Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2016 (Toronto: Carswell, 2017) 515 at 549-53 [Lund, 
“Gambling Debt”]; Williams, Belanger & Arthur, supra note 5; Sarra, supra note 6; 
Himmelstein, supra note 6, Diamond, supra note 6. 
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of gambling were criminalized in Canada and gambling was viewed as a moral 
problem: “a vice that [was] given in to by largely deviant individuals.”8 Under 
this moral model, excessive gambling constituted a form of willful misconduct, 
which attracted punitive responses.9 In the century that has elapsed since the 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was first adopted, gambling has been recast as a 
legitimate form of leisure and excessive gambling has been reframed as a medical 
problem—a type of addiction. Many of the legal actors practicing bankruptcy 
law have adopted a medicalized approach to gamblers. They have reoriented their 
practices to serve therapeutic ends. Yet, they may be inadvertently harming the 
bankrupts they are trying to help. This article argues that the case of the bankrupt 
gamblers can be used to illustrate the drawbacks of the medical model and the 
importance of incorporating social context evidence into the practice of law.
This article is the third in a trilogy of articles on bankrupt gamblers. The first 
article examined the practices of insolvency trustees and judicial officers, who 
are tasked with applying the punitive provision of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act to insolvent gamblers. That article reported that trustees and judicial officers 
adopt a range of approaches. Some continue to apply it in a way that is primarily 
punitive, while others embrace a medical model of gambling and have repurposed 
the provision to impose therapeutic interventions on the bankrupt gambler, such 
as counselling and gambling venue exclusion orders.10
The second article sought to provide insolvency trustees with guidance about 
how to identify and assist bankrupt gamblers by synthesizing literature from the 
interdisciplinary field of gambling studies. The article identified financial and 
behavioural red flags, which may indicate that someone has a gambling problem, 
8. Brian Castellani, Pathological Gambling: The Making of a Medical Problem (State University 
of New York Press, 2000) at 133. This tension—between medical and moral approaches to 
gambling—is not unique to bankruptcy law. See I Nelson Rose, “Compulsive Gambling: 
From Sin to Vice to Disease” (1988) 4 J Gambling Behav 240. Rose examines the incomplete 
shift towards a medical model of gambling in a number of areas of American law including 
criminal, family, and debt collection. 
9. See T Cameron Wild et al, “Attitudes towards Compulsory Substance Abuse Treatment: 
A Comparison of the Public, Counselors, Probationers & Judges’ Views” (2001) 8 Drugs 
33 at 42 citing David J Pittman, “The New Temperance Movement” in David J Pittman & 
Helene Raskin White, eds, Society, Culture and Drinking Patterns Reexamined (Rutgers Center 
of Alcohol Studies) 775.
10. See Lund, “Gambling Debt,” supra note 7. 
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and canvassed the evidence about the efficacy of therapeutic interventions for 
disordered gamblers.11
This third article uses the example of personal bankruptcy law to illustrate 
the drawbacks of legal actors using a medical model. The medical model can be 
compared favourably to the moral one, because actors who use it are inclined to 
adopt a therapeutic, helpful orientation, as opposed to a punitive one. But, as the 
title of this article suggests, being helpful is a fraught undertaking.12 This article 
argues that when legal actors adopt a medicalized approach towards bankrupt 
gamblers, they may inadvertently harm those gamblers, but that the risk of harms 
can be mitigated by incorporating social context evidence into their practices.
Thinking through the downsides of the medical model of gambling is 
important. When legal actors adopt a medical approach towards individuals who 
gamble, it can have significant impacts on those individuals. These impacts are 
diffuse because an individual’s gambling disorder can be relevant to a wide range 
of legal questions, in criminal law, family law, and civil litigation, to name a few. 
Gamblers are an important case study for a second reason, because a number 
of behaviours—such as compulsive shopping, sex and eating—are being recast 
as medical disorders, and the law’s response to these behaviours raises questions 
similar to those raised by the medicalization of excessive gambling.13
The balance of this article is organized into three parts. Part I describes 
the process by which gambling has been medicalized and briefly outlines 
some of the benefits and drawbacks of adopting a medical model of gambling. 
It then supplements the medical model of gambling with evidence about how 
a person’s social context shapes their gambling. Part II illustrates the downsides 
of the medical model and the importance of social context evidence, using the 
example of gamblers who apply for bankruptcy protection. It analyzes two 
factual scenarios: where an individual has contributed to their bankruptcy by 
gambling, and where an individual bankrupt has committed an additional bad 
act because of their gambling. Part III concludes by reflecting on the broader 
implications of this article. Social context education may be important for many 
11. See Anna J Lund & Arooj Shah, “Bankrupt Gamblers: Research Informed Practice for 
Insolvency Trustees” in Janis P Sarra & Barbara Romaine, eds, Annual Review of Insolvency 
Law 2018 (Thomson Reuters, 2019) 313.
12. See Lamott, supra note 1.
13. See Marcelo Piquet Pessoa et al, “DSM-5 & the Decision Not to Include Sex, Shopping or 
Stealing as Addictions” (2014) 1 Current Addiction Rep 172; Adrian Meule & Ashley N 
Gearhardt, “Food Addiction in the Light of DSM-5” (2014) 6 Nutrients 3653; JM Farré 
et al, “Sex Addiction and Gambling Disorder: Similarities and Differences” (2015) 56 
Comprehensive Psych 59. 
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different legal actors, including those who encounter gamblers in other areas of 
the law and those who encounter other medicalized behaviours. By refocusing 
our attention on the “social,” social context education may also be an impetus for 
broader social change.
I. GAMBLING: MEDICAL MODEL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
A. MEDICALIZATION OF GAMBLING
The medical model identifies human problems as having a biological cause. 
When the medical model is used to explain deviant behaviour, it attributes the 
individual’s misconduct to a defect in the brain or the body, or the introduction 
of a foreign agent that has led the brain or body to malfunction.14 The model 
seeks to identify the cause of the malfunctioning and to “cure” or “treat” it. 
Medicalization is a process whereby human conditions or problems become 
understood in terms of the medical model.15
Excessive gambling underwent a process of medicalization in the twentieth 
century; it was recast from being caused by individual immorality and instead 
became understood as the result of a malfunctioning brain.16 Sociologist John 
Rosecrance traces the medicalization process to the early part of the century, when 
psychoanalysts started to study gambling.17 The psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud 
authored a ground-breaking study in which he tried to explain the author Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky’s gambling in terms of the Oedipal complex.18 The psychoanalyst 
14. See Peter Conrad & Joseph Schneider, Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness 
(CV Mosby, 1980) at 35.
15. See Peter Conrad, The Medicalization of Society: On the Transformation of Human Conditions 
into Treatable Disorders (John Hopkins University Press, 2007) at 4-5. 
16. For a review of nineteenth-century psychiatry and the absence of gambling from this 
literature, see Alan F Collins, “The Pathological Gambler and the Government of Gambling” 
in James F Cosgrave, ed, The Sociology of Risk and Gambling Reader (Routledge, 2006) 355. 
Dave Dixon notes that in the twentieth century, religious groups opposed to gambling 
reframed their arguments in nonreligious terms. See Dave Dixon, “The Discovery of 
the Compulsive Gambler” in Zenon Bankowski & Geoff Mungham, eds, Essays in Law 
and Society (Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1980) 157; Colin S Campbell & Garry J Smith, 
“Gambling in Canada—From Vice to Disease to Responsibility: A Negotiated History” 
(2003) 20 Can Bull Med Hist 121 at 138.
17. See John Rosecrance, “Compulsive Gambling and the Medicalization of Deviance” (1985) 
32 Soc Probs 275 at 276; Castellani, supra note 8 at 24-25.
18. See Sigmund Freud, “Dostoevsky and Parricide,” translated by DF Tait, in James Strachey, 
ed, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol 21 
(Hogarth Press, 1961) 177. 
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Edmund Bergler published an article in 1943, and then a book in 1957 in 
which he identified the compulsive gambler as a “type.”19 The news magazine 
Maclean’s introduced Bergler’s work to Canadians with an article entitled “Mad 
About Gambling.”20
In 1957, the same year that Bergler published his treatise on gamblers, the 
first chapter of Gamblers Anonymous (“GA”) was founded in Los Angeles. The 
first Canadian GA meeting was held in Toronto in 1964.21 The establishment and 
growth of GA has been linked to the medical model because GA, modeled on 
Alcoholics Anonymous, adopted the view that compulsive gamblers suffer from 
a medical disorder.22 Attendance at GA is often prescribed to people suffering 
from excessive gambling. Practitioners developed other treatment options during 
the medicalization process. In 1972, the first in-patient treatment program 
specifically for gamblers was opened in Ohio.23 More recently, researchers have 
tested the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy and pharmaceuticals as 
treatment methods.24
In 1980, the American Psychiatrist’s Association added gambling to their 
influential reference work on mental disorders—the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”)—as an impulse control disorder.25 In 2013, 
it was renamed “gambling disorder” and was included alongside substance use 
19. See Edmund Bergler, “The Gambler: A Misunderstood Neurotic” in Selected Papers of 
Edmund Bergler, M.D. (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1969) 687; Edmund Bergler, The 
Psychology of Gambling (International Universities Press, 1970) at 6-7. Rosecrance, supra 
note 17 at 276. See also Edmund Bergler, “Zur Psychologie des Hasardspeilers” (1936) 22 
Imago 409. Edmund Bergler is also associated with the medicalization of homosexuality. See 
Conrad, supra note 15 at 98. 
20. See George Kisker, “Mad About Gambling” (1 September 1948), online: Maclean’s <archive.
macleans.ca/article/1948/9/1/mad-about-gambling>.
21. See Campbell & Smith, supra note 16 at 130. 
22. See David C Hodgins, Jonathan Stea & John E Grant, “Gambling Disorders” (2011) 
378 Lancet 1874 at 1881, n 111 citing Gamblers Anonymous, “Gamblers Anonymous 
International Directory”, online: <www.gamblersanonymous.org/ga/addresses>.
23. See Rosecrance, supra note 17 at 278. 
24. See David C Hodgins & Alice Holub, “Treatment of Problem Gambling” in Garry Smith, 
David C Hodgins & Robert J Williams, eds, Research and Measurement Issues in Gambling 
Studies (Elsevier, 2007) 371; Lund & Shah, supra note 11. 
25. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
3rd ed (American Psychiatric Association, 1980); Rosecrance, supra note 17 at 279. See 
also Castellani, supra note 8 at 20-23 (discussing the medicalization of gambling leading 
to recognition in the DSM). For those in Britain, an important step in the medicalization 
process was the inclusion of gambling in the ICD-10. See World Health Organization, The 
ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioral Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic 
Guidelines (World Health Organization, 1992). See also Collins, supra note 16 at 358. 
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disorders as a type of addiction.26 It is the first non-substance-related impulsive 
behaviour to be characterized as an addiction in the DSM. A key reason for this 
change in categorization is that there is a growing body of “research findings that 
gambling disorder is similar to substance-related disorders in clinical expression, 
brain origin, comorbidity, physiology, and treatment.”27
The medical model of gambling has many benefits over the moral model. 
It reduces the stigma otherwise experienced by individual gamblers and 
emphasizes humanitarian responses as opposed to punitive ones, because having 
a medical condition can operate as a form of excuse.28 An individual’s bad 
behaviour can be pardoned if the individual establishes that the behaviour was 
related to a medical condition. The sociologist Talcott Parsons formulated the 
concept of the “sick role” in the 1950s to explain the exculpatory potential of a 
medical diagnosis. According to Parsons, individuals are exempted from normal 
social obligations when they identify as sick because the manifestations of the 
illness are beyond their control; however, they must accept that their illness is 
undesirable and seek treatment.29 This concept is reflected across a range of areas 
of law. For example, the Criminal Code directs that no person shall be found 
guilty for a crime if at the time they committed it they were suffering from a 
mental disorder that prevented them from comprehending the wrongness of the 
act.30 In employment law, an employer may be required to give a second chance 
26. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).
27. American Psychiatric Association, “Substance Related and Addictive Disorders—
Fact Sheet” (2013), online: <www.dsm5.org/documents/substance%20use%20
disorder%20fact%20sheet.pdfwww.dsm5.org/documents/substance%20use%20
disorder%20fact%20sheet.pdf>.
28. See Castellani, supra note 8 at 104; Conrad & Schneider, supra note 14 at 246; Jackson Toby, 
“Medicalizing Temptation” (1998) 130 Pub Interest 64 at 64. 
29. See Talcott Parsons, “Social Structure and Dynamic Process: The Case of Modern Medical 
Practice” in The Social System (Free Press, 1951) 428 at 436-37; Conrad & Schneider, supra 
note 14 at 247. Talcott Parsons’s theory of the sick role has been described as “outdated,” and 
yet it remains useful for considering how legal actors think about gambling in the bankruptcy 
system. See Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple (Duke University Press, 2002) at 7.
30. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985 c C-46, s 16 [Criminal Code]; see e.g., R v Harding, 2006 
SKCA 118 at paras 15 and 16 (affirming that pathological gambling disorder may be relevant 
to moral culpability).
LUND,  HELP IS THE SUNNY SIDE OF CONTROL 497
to an employee who misbehaved at work, if a medical condition contributed to 
the employee’s misconduct.31
A second benefit available to individuals who can cast their gambling in 
medical terms is that they may be able to access a greater range of entitlements. 
Certain programs are only available to individuals who can establish that they 
are “sick.” For example, Canadians are entitled to temporary paid leave if they 
are unable to work due to an illness or injury.32 Because their condition has been 
recast as a medical problem as opposed to a moral one, disordered gamblers 
can now argue that they should be afforded the excuses and given access to the 
entitlements that are available to other sick Canadians.
It is not always beneficial for an individual to cast their gambling in medical 
terms. The law’s response to sick individuals has often been interventionist. 
Consider the long history of committing mentally-ill individuals to asylums. 
When an individual’s gambling is characterized as a medical disorder, it opens 
them up to paternalistic interventions. Paternalistic interventions are not 
necessarily bad; however, situations inviting paternalistic interventions need to be 
approached by potential interveners with healthy doses of humility and caution. 
One does not need to look far for instances of individuals being subject to serious 
violations of their dignity, security of the person, liberty, and even life by others 
who were trying to help. Many of these “helpful” interventions were justified 
using medical science.33
The move toward the medical model of gambling reinforces a power dynamic 
that privileges the expert helper and disempowers the problem gambler. Medical 
expertise is required to identify which individuals are genuinely sick and not 
merely malingering. Medical expertise is also used to identify and implement an 
appropriate treatment regime. Conversely, an individual may be disempowered 
by the medicalization of their problem, because they now require expert 
intervention to diagnose and treat the problem. By privileging medical expertise, 
31. See e.g., British Columbia Public Service Agency v BC Government and Service Employees’ 
Union, 2003 CarswellBC 3284 (LRB) (WL Can) at para 5 [BC Public Service]. See 
also Toronto Transit Commission v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 2, 2011 
CanLII 49050 (ON LA).
32. See Employment Insurance Act, SC 1996 c 23, s 12(3)(c).
33. Conrad and Schneider use eugenics as an example of harmful interventions justified 
on the basis of medical science. See supra note 14 at 222. Eugenics programs were also 
active in Canada, for example in Alberta from 1928 to 1972. See The Sexual Sterilization 
Act, RSA 1942, c 194. The Alberta Act was repealed by The Sexual Sterilization Repeal 
Act, SA 1972, c 87.
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the medical model invites paternalistic interventions by those who have access to 
such expertise, or who can frame their actions in medical terms.
The risk of paternalistic interventions is acute when the medical model is 
applied to addictions. A commonly held belief—part of the public conception of 
addiction as disease—is that denial is a symptom of the addiction. According to 
this line of thinking, addicted individuals deceive themselves and others about the 
true state of their health. Others need to intervene to help addicted individuals 
to see the truth of their situations and get treatment for their disorders.34 This 
manner of thinking justifies coercive practices. Any objections from the addicted 
individual are answered with the rejoinders that the addicted individual does not 
grasp the truth of their situation and everything is being done for their own good.35
Medicalizing a condition like problem gambling can destigmatize it and invite 
humane responses, but those humane responses risk veering into paternalistic, 
and even harmful territory. Like any model, the medical one oversimplifies reality 
by illuminating some aspects, while at the same time obscuring others.36 One can 
better understand and mitigate the risks of the medical model by intentionally 
shifting one’s focus to take account of those aspects of reality obscured by the 
medical model. One way of shifting one’s focus is to look beyond the question of 
individual malfunction to the individual’s social context.
B. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF GAMBLING
When legal actors characterize gambling as a medical condition, it may lead them 
to focus on an individual gambler. People without medical training often take 
a simplistic view of the medical model, assuming that it attributes illness solely 
to individual biology.37 This focus on biological causes can obscure the social 
context in which an individual develops a medical condition. This emphasis 
34. For a discussion of this trope in the discourse of addiction, see Helen Keane, What’s Wrong 
with Addiction (Melbourne University Press, 2002) at 72-77, 191. See also Fiona Nicoll, 
“Subjects in a State: Cultural Economies of Gambling” in Sytze F Kingma, ed, Global 
Gambling: Cultural Perspectives on Gambling Organizations (Routledge, 2010) 211 at 223: 
“the problem gambler is above all an individual who must be protected from him or herself.”
35. See e.g., Arthur Caplan, “Denying Autonomy in Order to Create It: The Paradox of Forcing 
Treatment upon Addicts” (2008) 103 Addiction 1919 at 1920. Caplan argues that “the 
moral basis for mandatory treatment is for the good of the patient by rebirthing autonomy.”
36. See Peter Ferentzy & Nigel E Turner, “Morals, Medicine, Metaphors and the History of the 
Disease Model of Problem Gambling” (2012) 27 J Gambling Iss 1 at 8.
37. See Rachel Volberg & Matt Wray, “Legal Gambling and Problem Gambling as Mechanisms 
of Social Domination” (2007) 51 Am Behav Sci 56 at 67.
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on the individual—as the locus of the disorder—fits with and is reinforced by 
influential ideologies including the Protestant work ethic and neoliberalism.38
The lay perspective of what causes a medical condition can be more 
individualized than the perspectives of those who study the condition. Gambling 
researchers acknowledge that an individual’s chances of succumbing to a gambling 
disorder are impacted by the environment in which an individual lives. Some 
have adopted a public health approach to gambling, which emphasizes how one’s 
social environment contributes to one’s wellness.39 Others use a “biopsychosocial” 
model, which reflects the idea that many different factors can contribute to an 
individual developing a gambling disorder, including social experiences.40 These 
researchers have identified several aspects of an individual’s social context that 
shape gambling behaviour. This article considers two: (i) gambling opportunities 
have become more accessible and this increased accessibility impacts the 
prevalence of gambling related harm, and (ii) members of socially marginalized 
groups are disproportionately diagnosed as having gambling problems. The 
following two subsections synthesize the current research on these aspects of 
gambling’s social context.
1. DISORDERED BEHAVIOUR AND THE ACCESSIBILITY OF GAMBLING 
VENUES
Informed by a public health model, gambling researchers have long posited that as 
gambling becomes more accessible in a community, more people will participate 
in gambling resulting in more gambling-related harm, including more disordered 
38. Conrad & Schneider suggest that the medical model’s emphasis on the individual is highly 
compatible with the Protestant work ethic. See supra note 14 at 57. On the dominant role of 
the individual in neoliberal conceptions of society, see Wendy Brown, “Neoliberalism and the 
End of Liberal Democracy,” in Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton 
University Press, 2005) 37 at 42-44. 
39. See Ferentzy & Turner, supra note 36 at 12-14; Howard J Shaffer, Richard A LaBrie & Debi 
Plante, “Laying the Foundation for Quantifying Regional Exposure to Social Phenomena: 
Considering the Case of Legalized Gambling as a Public Health Toxin” (2004) 18 Psychol 
Addictive Behav 40; David A Korn & Howard J Shaffer, “Gambling and the Health of the 
Public: Adoption of a Public Health Perspective” (1999) 15 J Gambling Stud 289; Rachel 
A Volberg, “The Prevalence and Demographics of Pathological Gamblers: Implications for 
Public Health” (1994) 84 Am J Pub Health 237 [Volberg, “Pathological Gamblers”]. 
40. See Hodgins, Stea & Grant, supra note 22 at 1878. 
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gambling.41 This proposition is called the accessibility hypothesis. Testing the 
accessibility hypothesis has proven to be complex because there are many different 
dimensions to accessibility.42 Accessibility has physical dimensions, which refer to 
the number and location of gambling venues, the number of games in each venue, 
hours of operation, and conditions of entry.43 Accessibility has social dimensions, 
which refer to how inviting a venue is to participants and how socially acceptable 
gambling is to their friends and families.44 Accessibility has cognitive dimensions, 
which refer to whether individuals understand how to use a gambling product, 
e.g., do they know the rules of a table game or how to operate a machine game?45
Researchers studying accessibility have focused on its physical dimensions, 
and some of this research has found a correlation between accessibility of gambling 
and the prevalence of problem gambling. Interjurisdictional comparisons have 
shown that problem gambling rates are higher where there are more gambling 
venues46 or where gambling has been legal for longer.47 Meta-studies suggest that 
adding new gambling venues or formats leads to an increase in prevalence rates 
41. See Max Abbott, “Gambling and Gambling harm in New Zealand: A 28 Year Case Study” 
(2017) 15 Intl J Mental Health Addiction 1221 at 1231; Shaffer, LaBrie & Plante, supra 
note 39 at 42. Whereas previously, much research on the impacts of gambling focused on the 
prevalence of gambling disorders, researchers in gambling studies are now studying a broader 
range of gambling related harm. See Langham et al, supra note 3.
42. See Nerilee Hing & John Haw, “The Development of a Multi-Dimensional Gambling 
Accessibility Scale” (2009) 25 J Gambling Stud 569 at 570; see also Productivity 
Commission, Australia’s gambling industries: Report No. 10 (AusInfo, 1999) at 8.4 
[Productivity Commission].
43. See Hing & Haw, ibid at 570. 
44. See ibid at 572; Lorne Tepperman et al, The Dostoevsky Effect (Oxford University Press, 
2013) at 224-227 (arguing that people are more likely to turn to gambling when it has been 
“normalized”). 
45. See Hing & Haw, supra note 42 at 575. 
46. See Brian J Cox et al, “A National Survey of Gambling Problems in Canada” (2005) 50 Can 
J Psychiatry 213 at 216 (finding higher rates of problem gambling in provinces with a high 
concentration of video lottery terminals and casinos).
47. See Volberg, “Pathological Gamblers,” supra note 39 at 239. Researchers have found no 
relationship between the number of different formats of gambling available in a jurisdiction 
and the prevalence rates of problem gambling. See Simon Planzer, Heather M Gray & 
Howard Schaffer, “Associations Between National Gambling Policies and Disordered 
Gambling Prevalence Rates Within Europe” (2014) 37 Intl JL & Psychiatry 217.
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of problem gambling.48 There is research to suggest that individuals living near to 
gambling venues are more likely to suffer from gambling disorders as compared 
to those who live farther away.49
Other researchers argue that the relationship between accessibility, 
gambling, and gambling related harm is more complex than the accessibility 
hypothesis suggests. Some have advanced an “adaptation hypothesis,” that “over 
time novelty wears off and this and other factors lead to reduced participation, 
increased resilience and a decrease in problems and harm, even when availability 
increases.”50 These “other” protective factors can include “increased awareness 
of problem gambling, development of informal social controls, expansion of 
treatment and mutual help and regulatory changes.”51 Some research supports 
the adaptation hypothesis. Researchers studying a new casino in Gatineau, 
Quebec, found that one year after it opened, the rate at which people living in 
the region played casino games and the amounts of money they lost in a day 
of gambling increased significantly when this group was compared to people 
living elsewhere in Quebec.52 However, these differences faded over time.53 
Moreover, the introduction of the casino in Gatineau did not result in higher 
48. See John Storer, Max Abbott & Judith Stubbs, “Access or Adaptation? A meta-analysis of 
surveys of problem gambling prevalence in Australia and New Zealand With Respect to 
the Concentration of Electronic Gaming Machines” (2009) 9 Intl Gambling Stud 225 at 
238 (finding that increases in EGM density correlate with increases in problem gambling 
prevalence). See also Productivity Commission, supra note 42 at 8.31 (the strongest evidence 
relates to a connection between the increased number of electronic gambling machines and 
increased prevalence of problem gambling). 
49. Henry Tong & David Chim reviewed the literature in 2013 and found eleven studies looking 
at the relationship between proximity to a casino and prevalence rates for gambling disorder; 
seven found a link between the two. See Tong and Chim, “The relationship between casino 
proximity and problem gambling” (2013) 3 Asian J Gambling Iss & Pub Health 1; New 
Zealand Ministry of Health, “Raising the Odds? Gambling Behavior & Neighbourhood 
Access to Gambling Venues in New Zealand” (2 May 2008), online: <www.health.govt.nz/
system/files/documents/publications/raising-the-odds-may08.pdf>.
50. Abbott, supra note 41 at 1232. 
51. Storer, Abbott & Stubbs, supra note 48 at 227. 
52. See Robert Ladouceur, Francine Ferland & Christian Jacques, “Impact of Availability on 
Gambling: A Longitudinal Study” (2000) 45 Can J Psychiatry 810. 
53. See Christian Jacques & Robert Ladouceur, “A Prospective Study of the Impact of Opening a 
Casino on Gambling Behaviors” (2006) 51 Can J Psychiatry 764.
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rates of gambling disorder amongst nearby residents as compared to others in the 
province.54 Researchers report similar findings in other jurisdictions.55
Some of the research on problem gambling indicates that neither the 
availability nor the adaptation hypothesis fully captures the relationship between 
accessibility, gambling, and gambling related harm. In 2017, researchers analyzing 
twenty-eight years of data from New Zealand found that as legal gambling 
opportunities increased, overall participation rates have decreased, supporting 
the adaptation hypothesis, but problem gambling rates have been much stickier, 
suggesting that they are not subject to adaptation.56
Based on the available evidence, one can conclude that the accessibility 
of gambling does impact the rate of gambling related harm in a community, 
including the prevalence of disordered gambling, but the relationship is complex 
and subject to some degree of adaptation.
The history of gambling in Canada is a history of growing accessibility. 
Before 1969, most forms of gambling were criminal in Canada, with the 
exception of games of chance at religious bazaars and agricultural fairs, private 
betting in groups of ten or less, and horse racing.57 Starting in 1969 and through 
to 1985, the federal government relaxed the criminal prohibitions on gambling.58 
As a result of these amendments to the Criminal Code, many additional forms 
of gambling—lotteries, casinos, bingo halls, EGM, and online gambling—are 
now legal in Canada as long as they are either conducted or managed by a 
provincial government.59
Decriminalizing gambling made it more accessible in at least two ways. First, 
gambling is more socially acceptable because one can gamble legally. Second, 
opportunities for legal gambling have proliferated across the country as provincial 
54. See Jacques & Ladouceur, supra note 53 at 770. However, more individuals in the Gatineau 
region reported having a family member with a gambling disorder. 
55. See Rachel Volberg, “Has There Been a Feminization of Gambling and Problem Gambling 
in the United States” (2003) 8 J Gambling Issues, online: <jgi.camh.net/jgi/index.php/
jgi/article/view/3619/3579> [Volberg, “Feminization of Gambling”] (reporting declining 
participation rates after the introduction of legalized gambling in Montana, Oregon 
and Washington). 
56. See Abbott, supra note 41 at 1233-34; see also Storer, Abbott & Stubbs, supra note 48 at 
238-39 (finding results supporting both adaptation and accessibility).
57. See Suzanne Morton, At Odds: Gambling and Canadians 1919–1969 (University of Toronto 
Press, 2003) at 10-11. 
58. See Colin S Campbell, Timothy F Hartnagel & Garry J Smith, “The Legalization of 
Gambling in Canada” in Janet Mosher & Joan Brockman, eds, Constructing Crime: 
Contemporary Processes of Criminalization (UBC Press, 2010) 153.
59. See Criminal Code, supra note 30, s 207(1)(a). 
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governments have promoted gambling as a legitimate form of entertainment.60 
There are over 35,000 gambling venues in Canada, including almost 30,000 
lottery ticket outlets, over 4,800 venues with electronic gambling machines 
(“EGMs”), 195 bingo halls, and seventy-seven casinos.61 This proliferation of 
gambling venues has been lucrative for the public purse: gambling generates nearly 
fourteen billion dollars in annual net revenue for governments across Canada.62
Provincial governments not only promote gambling as a legitimate form 
of entertainment, they also allow for gambling to be provided in formats that 
increase the risk of addiction. There is a significant, though not universal, 
consensus amongst researchers that EGMs, such as video lottery terminals, 
are associated with a heightened risk of disordered gambling.63 In Canada, 
individuals who play EGMs lose significantly more money every year than people 
who play other gambling formats.64 Amongst individuals seeking help for their 
60. See James F Cosgrave, “Governing the Gambling Citizen: The State, Consumption and Risk” 
in James F Cosgrave & Thomas R Klassen, eds, Casino State: Legalized Gambling in Canada 
(University of Toronto Press, 2009) 46 at 55 (arguing that the state has a financial interest in 
producing more gamblers and gambling markets in Canada).
61. See Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling, “Gaming Venues and/or Designated 
Areas” (2018), online: <cprg.ca/Digests/ViewMainCards?yearId=507db81e-e5bf-e611-b52a-
1abbb38a3094> [Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling].
62. In 2009, the net revenue to governments from provincial government-run lotteries, video 
lottery terminals (VLTs), casinos and slot machines not in casinos was $13.8 billion. See 
Statistics Canada, Canada Yearbook 2011 (Minister of Industry, 2011) at 224. In 2013–14, 
revenue “measured as wagers less prize payouts, before operating expenses deducted” 
remained at $13.7 billion. See Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling, Canadian 
Gambling Digest 2013–14 (2015) at 6, online: <www.responsiblegambling.org/docs/
default-source/default-document-library/cprg_canadian-gambling-digest_2013-14.pdf>. 
63. See Murat Yücel et al, “Neuroscience in Gambling: Policy and Treatment” (2017) 4 Lancet 
Psychiatry 501 at 503. Conversely, see Alex Blaszczynski, “A Critical Examination of the Link 
Between Gaming Machines and Gambling Related Harm” (2013) 7 J Gambling Bus & Econ 
55. See also Nicki Dowling, David Smith & Trang Thomas, “Electronic Gambling Machines: 
Are They the Crack Cocaine of Addiction” (2004) 100 Addiction 33. While Yücel et al state 
that EGMs are the “source of the greatest harm in gambling,” Blaszczynski and Dowling 
et al argue that the research on the relative addictiveness of electronic gambling machines 
remains inconclusive. 
64. See Vance Victor MacLaren, “Video Lottery is the Most Harmful Form of Gambling in 
Canada” (2016) 32 J Gambling Stud 459 at 469. Canadians lost $2,067.15 per year for 
individuals playing electronic gambling machines outside of dedicated gambling venues (e.g., 
casinos) and $1,449.22/year for individuals playing them in casinos, compared to $400.85/
year on horse racing and $196.35/year on lotteries. These average losses are derived from 
statistics spanning the period from 2002 to 2012. 
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gambling problems, the most frequently reported activity is playing EGMs.65 
Treatment-seeking gamblers report progressing from gambling involvement to 
disordered gambling more quickly when their primary form of gambling is on 
machines.66 The prevalence rate of problem gambling is higher amongst people 
who play EGMs, as opposed to other gambling formats.67 The prevalence rate 
of problem gambling in a community increases when EGMs are added,68 and 
decreases when they are banned.69 A person is more likely to be a problem 
gambler if they live near an EGM.70
EGMs are especially addictive because they are engineered to include design 
features that “impair [a player’s ability] to make rational choices.”71 For example, 
EGMs often “disguise” losses as wins, meaning that when a player has won some 
money, but less than the initial bet, the machine celebrates the outcome with 
sounds and lights.72 In other words, the machine provides positive reinforcement 
65. See Karen A Urbanoski & Brian R Rush, “The Characteristics of People Seeking 
Treatment for Problem Gambling in Ontario: Trends from 1998 to 2002” (2006) 16 J 
Gambling Iss, online: <jgi.camh.net/index.php/jgi/article/view/3720/3680>, at Table 5 
(slots became the most frequently reported problem over the period studied); Robert B 
Breen & Mark Zimmerman, “The Rapid Onset of Pathological Gambling in Machine 
Gamblers” (2002) 18 J Gambling Stud 31 at 33; Nancy M Petry, “A Comparison of 
Treatment Seeking Pathological Gamblers Based on Preferred Gambling Activity” (2003) 98 
Addiction 645 at 648.
66. See Breen & Zimmerman, supra note 65 at 34. 
67. See Yücel, supra note 63 at 501; MacLaren, supra note 64 at 473; Tracie O Afifi et al, “The 
Relation Between Types and Frequency of Gambling Activities and Problem Gambling 
Among Women in Canada” (2010) 55 Can J Psychiatry 21; JP Doiron & Richard M 
Nicki, “Epidemiology of Problem Gambling in Prince Edward Island” (2001) 46 Can 
J Psychiatry 413. Debi A La Plante et al found that the relationship between gambling 
format and prevalence rates of problem gambling largely disappeared once they controlled 
for an individual’s level of involvement (i.e., number of times played per year), although 
even once involvement was controlled for, individuals playing virtual gambling machines 
were still more likely to be problem gamblers than individuals engaged in other gambling 
formats. See “Disordered Gambling, Type of Gambling and Gambling Involvement in 
the British Prevalence Survey” (2011) 21 Eur J Pub Health 532. DC Hodgins et al found 
that high frequency gamblers were more likely to have a problem gambling disorder if they 
played electronic gambling machines. See “Disordered Gambling Amongst High Frequency 
Gamblers” (2012) 42 Psychol Med 2433 at 2442. 
68. See Storer, Abbott & Stubbs, supra note 48 at 238.
69. See Ingeborg Lund, “Gambling Behavior and the Prevalence of Gambling Problems 
in EGM Gamblers When EGMs are Banned. A Natural Experiment” (2009) 25 J 
Gambling Stud 215.
70. See New Zealand Ministry of Health, supra note 49. 
71. Yücel et al, supra note 63 at 503.
72. See Yücel et al, supra note 63 at 503. See also MacLaren, supra note 64 at 463-64.
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to players, even when they are in the process of losing money.73 The machines 
may also be designed to provide a higher number of “near misses,” which refers to 
an outcome of a game that appears close to a win but is still a loss.74 Near misses 
cause gamblers to overestimate their chances of winning and to play games longer, 
leading to higher losses.75 Additionally, it has been observed that the machines’ 
capacity for “uninterrupted fast and continuous play … may facilitate immersive 
states and escapist gambling.”76
Despite the research indicating that EGMs are problematic, they are readily 
available in Canada.77 TABLE 1 sets out the total number of EGMs, as well 
as the number of EGMs for every thousand adults (fifteen or older) in each 
province, demonstrating this ready availability. Some provinces have attempted 
to regulate the design of EGMs to address some of the machines’ risky design 
features.78 However, EGM manufacturers have proven capable of innovating 
around such regulations.79
73. See Mike J Dixon et al, “Losses Disguised as Wins in Modern Multi-Line Video Slot 
Machines” (2010) 105 Addiction 1819 (finding individuals had similar physiological 
responses to wins as to losses disguised as wins). 
74. See Kevin A Harrigan, “Slot Machine Structural Characteristics: Creating Near Misses Using 
High Award Symbol Ratios” (2008) 6 Intl J Mental Health Addiction 353 at 361-64. 
75. See Harrigan, supra note 74 at 365-66. See also Luke Clark et al, “Physiological Responses 
to Near Miss Outcomes and Personal Control During Stimulated Gambling” (2012) 21 J 
Gambling Stud 123; Mike J Dixon et al, “Psychophysiological Arousal Signatures of Near 
Misses in Slot-Machine Play” (2011) 11 Intl J Gambling Stud 393; Guillaume Sescousse 
et al, “Amplified Striatal Responses to Near-Miss Outcomes in Pathological Gamblers” 
(2016) 41 Neuropsychopharmacology 2614; Kevin Harrigan et al, “Games of Chance or 
Masters of Illusion: Multiline Slots Design may Promote Cognitive Distortions” (2014) 14 
Intl Gambling Stud 301 (suggesting that multi-line slot machines may promote cognitive 
distortions by giving players a false sense of control). 
76. MacLaren, supra note 64 at 463; see also Spencer Murch, Stephanie WM Chu & Luke 
Clark, “Measuring the Slot Machines Zone with Attentional Dual Tasks and Respiratory 
Sinus Arrhythmia” (2017) 31 Psychol Addictive Behav 375.
77. See Ray MacNeil, “Government as Gambling Regulator and Operator: The Case of 
Electronic Gambling Machines” in Cosgrove & Klassen, supra note 60, 140 at 142 (making 
this claim with respect to Nova Scotia).
78. See Electronic Gaming Systems Minimal Technical Standards (Alcohol and Gaming 
Commission of Ontario, 2017) at 34-35 (regulating near misses by prohibiting machines 
from auto-initiating extended play features). 
79. See Harrigan, supra note 74 at 361-64 (discussing EGM programming and near misses). 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF EGMS, BY PROVINCE
Provinces Total Number of EGMs Gambling Machines per 1000 Adults (15 or older)






New Brunswick 2,740 4.2
Nova Scotia 3,517 4.3
Prince Edward Island 494 4.0
Newfoundland 1,896 4.2
SOURCES: Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling, supra note 61; Statistics 
Canada, “Population by broad age groups and sex, for both sexes, Canada, by Statistical 
Area Classification, 2016 Census – 100% Data” online: <www12.statcan.gc.ca/
census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/hlt-fst/as/Table.cfm?Lang=E&T=21>.
Canadians with gambling disorders have not developed these disorders in a 
vacuum. Gambling is readily accessible in Canada because the federal government 
legalized it and provincial governments promote many different forms of it, 
including highly addictive EGMs. By making gambling more accessible, these 
political decisions have contributed to the rate at which Canadians experience 
disordered gambling. These political decisions have also proven to be very 
lucrative for governments. Canadians profit off an activity that proves harmful 
for a minority of participants. Moreover, evidence suggests that gambling 
disproportionately harms some socio-demographic groups.
2. DISORDERED GAMBLING AND SOCIAL MARGINALITY
Gambling harm is not evenly distributed throughout the population. People 
from marginalized socio-economic groups—racialized peoples, Indigenous 
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peoples, and people with a low socio-economic status—are at a higher risk of 
having a diagnosable gambling disorder.80
Researchers have offered different explanations for the higher prevalence 
of diagnosable gambling problems amongst marginalized groups. Members of 
these groups may be more likely to develop a gambling disorder as a result of 
their social context. Gambling opportunities may be more accessible to these 
groups because there is a higher concentration of gambling venues in their 
neighbourhoods or because the people in their social networks are more accepting 
of gambling. If gambling is accessible and normalized, individuals will use it as 
a coping mechanism when faced with stressors, especially if they have not had 
the opportunity to learn other, less risky coping mechanisms.81 Alternatively, 
individuals from marginalized socio-economic groups may use gambling as a 
mechanism for “acquiring capital and building wealth” —especially when they 
feel excluded from more mainstream methods of wealth creation.82 Gambling 
can also provide an opportunity for marginalized individuals to “get some action, 
beat the system, demonstrate control over their lives or gain prestige amongst 
their friends.”83
A second explanation for the higher rates of diagnosable gambling disorders 
amongst these marginalized groups is that the members of these groups are more 
likely to have their gambling activities pathologized, i.e., they may be more likely 
to be diagnosed with a gambling disorder. For starters, many of the gambling-like 
activities that wealthy individuals engage in—such as speculating on real estate or 
80. Many researchers have studied racialized peoples and low socio-economic status. See for 
instance Hodgins, Stea & Grant, supra note 22 at 1876; see also Heather Wardel et al, British 
Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 (National Centre for Social Research, 2011) at 89-90; 
Volberg & Wray, supra note 37 at 69-77; Volberg, “Feminization of Gambling,” supra note 
55 (finding higher problem gambling prevalence rates amongst non-whites in Washington, 
New York, Oregon and Montana); Nancy M Petry & Carlos Blanco, “National Gambling 
Experiences in the United States: Will History Repeat Itself ” (2013) 108 Addiction 1032 at 
1033; John W Welte et al, “Risk Factors for Pathological Gambling” (2004) 29 Addictive 
Behav 323 at 332; Abbott, supra note 41 at 1237. Indigenous peoples have also been the 
focus of particular attention. See e.g. Abbott, supra note 41 at 1237; Rachel A Volberg & 
Max W Abbott, “Gambling & Problem Gambling Among Indigenous Peoples” (1997) 32 
Substance Use & Misuse 1525. Not all research has found a higher rate amongst Indigenous 
peoples. See Kathryn Gill et al, “The Social and Psychological Impacts of Gambling in the 
Cree Communities of Northern Quebec” (2016) 32 J Gambling Stud 441 at 453.
81. See Tepperman et al, supra note 44 at 106-107.
82. See Volberg & Wray, supra note 37 at 77. See also Welte et al, supra note 80 at 334. 
83. Volberg & Abbott, supra note 80 at 1534 citing Rachel A Volberg, Donald C Reitzes & 
Jacqueline Boles, “Exploring the Link Between Gambling, Problem Gambling, and Self 
Esteem” (1997) 18 Deviant Behav 321 at 336. 
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corporate stocks—are not classified as gambling.84 Additionally, the tools used for 
diagnosing problem gambling may shield some groups from detection, such as 
“whites with wealth.”85 For example, the Canadian Problem Gambling Severity 
Index is a commonly used diagnostic tool for identifying individuals with 
gambling disorders. It contains nine questions, such as, “Have you bet more than 
you could really afford to lose?” and “Has your gambling caused any financial 
problems for you or your household?”86 Individuals from marginalized groups 
tend to be less financially secure, meaning that they can more quickly overspend 
or run into financial problems as compared to wealthier individuals.87 Their lack 
of wealth makes these individuals more likely to trigger the diagnostic criteria for 
having a gambling disorder.88
The disparate prevalence of diagnosable gambling disorders amongst 
socially marginalized groups points to several problems. If people from socially 
marginalized groups are gambling to excess more than other members of a 
community, it means the government-conducted gambling activities are having 
a disproportionately harmful impact on already marginalized groups. Because 
gambling is a significant source of revenue, some commentators contend that 
gambling is “ser[ving] a role similar to a voluntary regressive tax for low income 
and vulnerable groups.”89 If members of marginalized groups are more likely to 
have their gambling activities pathologized, it means they are more likely to be 
subject to medical control and paternalistic interventions. Canada has a history of 
enforcing facially neutral gambling laws in a racially biased manner. For example, 
the criminal prohibitions on gambling were disproportionately enforced against 
Chinese individuals.90 There is a risk that the medicalization of gambling might 
enable this racially disparate social control to continue, but in terms that are cast 
as therapeutic as opposed to punitive.
84. See Korn & Shaffer, supra note 39 at 292 (arguing that day trading and transactions on 
the commodity and futures markets should be defined as gambling); Harry Glasbeek, Class 
Privilege: How Law Shelters Shareholders and Coddles Capitalism (Between the Lines, 2017) at 
52-53 (comparing shareholders and gamblers). See also Morton, supra note 57 at 28.
85. See Volberg & Wray, supra note 37 at 74-75. 
86. See, for instance, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, “Gambling Quiz,” online (pdf ): 
<learn.problemgambling.ca/PDF%20library/assessment-pgsi-en.pdf>.
87. See Volberg & Wray, supra note 37 at 77.
88. See Welte et al, supra note 80 at 334. 
89. Korn & Shaffer, supra note 39 at 314. 
90. See Morton, supra note 57 at 120-24. 
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II. THE MEDICAL MODEL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT EVIDENCE 
IN CANADIAN PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
Social context evidence is relevant to personal bankruptcy practice because it 
can shift how a legal actor thinks about whether an individual is deserving of 
debt relief. People working in the bankruptcy system perform such assessments 
in two types of situations: (i) where someone has contributed to their 
financial difficulties by gambling and (ii) where someone has engaged in other 
conduct, which bankruptcy law deems to be culpable, because of a gambling 
disorder. In both of these situations, legal actors using the medical model may 
inadvertently harm individual bankrupts. In both situations, the risk of harm 
can be mitigated by incorporating social context evidence into the practices of 
legal actors. When an individual has contributed to their financial difficulties by 
gambling, social context evidence supports two shifts in practice: to stop delaying 
their discharge and to stop subjecting them to compulsory gambling treatment. 
When an individual has committed an additional culpable act and attributes 
their misfeasance to their gambling, social context evidence adds nuance to a 
legal actor’s assessment of the individual’s culpability.
This section starts by providing a backgrounder on how individuals access 
debt relief in the Canadian personal bankruptcy system. It explains how legal 
actors, namely insolvency trustees and judicial officers, can impede an individual 
from accessing debt relief if the legal actors determine that the individual is 
undeserving. The section then analyzes the two scenarios where gambling can be 
relevant to a legal actor’s assessment of debtor deservingness. For each scenario, 
the section identifies the harms that can result from using the medical model and 
how incorporating social context evidence reduces the risk of harm.
A. A BACKGROUNDER ON CANADIAN PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
In Canada, personal bankruptcy is a matter of federal jurisdiction and governed 
by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.91 Individuals file for bankruptcy when they 
have debts they cannot pay and need relief. Individuals start the bankruptcy 
process by signing up with an insolvency trustee. Insolvency trustees are private 
sector professionals who administer bankruptcies. During bankruptcy, a trustee 
collects the individuals’ property, realizes its value by selling assets and liquidating 
investments, and distributes that value amongst the creditors.
91. See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(21), reprinted in RSC 1985, 
Appendix II, No 5; Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA].
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Upon filing for bankruptcy, individuals are automatically protected by a 
stay, which temporarily prevents creditors from trying to collect their debts.92 
When individuals complete the bankruptcy process, their debts are released.93 
Released debts still exist, but creditors are permanently barred from trying to 
collect them.94 This release of debts is called a discharge. Most individuals who 
file for bankruptcy will receive a discharge automatically after a set period of time 
(varying from nine to thirty-six months) has elapsed.95
A small number of debtors, roughly 10 per cent, do not receive an automatic 
discharge of their debts.96 Instead, these individuals must attend a court hearing 
and satisfy the presiding judicial officer that they deserve to receive a discharge.97 
A court hearing is required in some situations—for example, if a debtor has been 
bankrupt more than two times already, or if the individual is using bankruptcy 
primarily to release personal income tax debt.98 Alternatively, a court hearing may 
be triggered if someone files paperwork opposing a debtor’s automatic discharge. 
Three different parties can file an opposition: a creditor, an analyst working for 
the agency of the federal government that oversees bankruptcies, or an insolvency 
trustee.99 Insolvency trustees file the overwhelming majority of oppositions.100
92. See BIA, ibid, s 69.3.
93. See ibid, s 178(2). 
94. See Schreyer v. Schreyer, 2011 SCC 35 at para 21. 
95. See BIA, supra note 91, s 168.1
96. See Anna J Lund, Discretionary Decision-Making by Trustees in Canada’s Personal Bankruptcy 
System (PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2015) [unpublished] at 2 [Lund, 
Discretionary Decision-making]; see also Anna J Lund, Trustees at Work: Financial Pressures, 
Emotional Labour and Canadian Bankruptcy Law (UBC Press, 2019) at 29 [Lund, 
Trustees at Work].
97. In his study of bankruptcies filed in Toronto in 1994, Iain Ramsay found that oppositions 
were lodged in 14 per cent of all cases. See Iain DC Ramsay, “Individual Bankruptcy: 
Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 15 at 69. 
The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy’s 2012 records indicate that 74,731 new 
bankruptcies were commenced. See Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, 
“Insolvency Statistics in Canada” (last modified 24 March 2015), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br03063.html>. Oppositions were filed in 7,012 cases in 2012 [statistics 
provided by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy on file with the author].
98. The personal income tax debtor section, which came into force in 2009, stipulates that an 
individual will not receive an automatic discharge if the individual has at least $200,000 in 
income tax debt, and income tax debt makes up 75 per cent or more of the individuals total, 
unsecured debt load. See BIA, supra note 91, s 172.1.
99. See ibid, s 168.2.
100. See Lund, Discretionary Decision-Making, supra note 96 at Table 1.1. See also Lund, Trustees 
at Work, supra note 96 at Table 3. 
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Trustees file oppositions in two situations: when a debtor misbehaved 
before filing for bankruptcy, or when a debtor fails to cooperate during the 
bankruptcy process. Trustees file most of their oppositions in response to a 
debtor’s non-cooperation during the bankruptcy process.101 Debtors have a 
number of duties that they must complete during the bankruptcy, such as filing 
monthly budgets, attending counselling, and making monthly payments to the 
trustee. When debtors do not complete their duties, the trustee can oppose their 
discharge. Trustees file a smaller number of oppositions in response to the debtor’s 
pre-bankruptcy misconduct. The misconduct may relate to how a debtor’s debts 
were incurred or how their affairs were managed. For example, trustees will often 
oppose if there is evidence that the debtor strategically organized their affairs to 
protect their property from creditors.102
If a discharge hearing is triggered, either because it is required by law or 
because someone filed an opposition, the presiding judicial officer has five 
options for disposing of the matter:103 (1) An absolute discharge: If a judicial 
officer grants an absolute discharge, the discharge takes effect immediately. (2) A 
suspended discharge: If a judicial officer suspends the discharge, the discharge will 
take effect at a later date. Suspensions can range from a few days to a number of 
years.104 (3) A conditional discharge: The judicial officer can make the discharge 
contingent on the debtor fulfilling one or more conditions. Commonly, judicial 
officers require debtors to make further payments to their trustees. (4) A refused 
discharge: If a judicial officer refuses the discharge application, the individual 
remains in bankruptcy until some future time when a judicial officer is satisfied 
that the individual is now deserving of a discharge. (5) Adjourn the hearing:105 
If a debtor has disappeared (i.e., stopped communicating with their trustee), 
the judicial officer might adjourn the hearing indefinitely. When the debtor 
re-appears, they must then take steps to have the matter brought back before a 
judicial officer.
101. See Lund, Discretionary Decision-Making, supra note 96 at Table 4.1. See also Lund, Trustees 
at Work, supra note 96 at Table 5. 
102. See Roderick Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, 2nd ed (Irwin Law, 2015) at 310-11. 
103. See BIA, supra note 91, s 172. 
104. A review of suspended discharge orders granted to bankrupt gamblers found suspensions 
ranging from one month to fifteen years in length. See Lund, “Gambling Debt,” supra 
note 7 at 556. 
105. See e.g., Resolution Services, “Making an Application for a Discharge from Bankruptcy” 
(2017) at 14, online: <www.alberta.ca/assets/documents/rcas-making-an-application-for-a-
discharge-from-bankruptcy.pdf>.
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Judicial officers have significant discretion in crafting discharge orders; 
however, the legislation does place one limit on their discretion. The legislation 
includes a list of behaviours, and if it is established that the debtor engaged in 
any of these behaviours, the court cannot grant an absolute discharge.106 One of 
the behaviours included in this legislated list is gambling: This is the provision 
that can be used to deny gamblers access to debt relief.107 This provision has been 
part of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act since the federal government enacted its 
precursor in 1919, and the language of the provision is borrowed from England’s 
Bankruptcy Act, 1914.108 
Trustees, creditors, and federal government analysts will often justify opposing 
a debtor’s discharge using the categories of behaviour set out in the legislation. 
For example, they could oppose because an individual incurred gambling-related 
debts. However, the legislated list is neither exhaustive nor mandatory for 
potential opponents. Parties can file oppositions on grounds other than the ones 
included in the list, and they are not required to file an opposition when one of 
the listed grounds exists. In other words, trustees may oppose because a bankrupt 
has gambled, but they are not required to do so. In most cases, if a trustee does 
not file an opposition, the debtor will receive an automatic discharge.
When an individual goes bankrupt, the insolvency trustee must decide 
whether or not to trigger a discharge hearing. When a hearing is triggered, the 
judicial officer must decide what type of order to grant. These decisions are 
shaped by whether the trustees and judicial officers view bankrupt individuals 
as deserving. Gambling can be relevant to the legal actors’ assessments of 
deservingness in at least two situations—where an individual’s gambling 
contributed to their financial difficulties and where an individual has committed 
some other culpable act, claiming they were driven to it by their gambling.
B. WHEN GAMBLING CAUSES BANKRUPTCY
Individuals may file for bankruptcy in a situation where their gambling has 
caused or aggravated their financial distress. These individuals will have more 
difficulty accessing debt relief than non-gamblers and may be compelled to 
106. See BIA, supra note 91, ss 172(2), 173.
107. See ibid, s 173(1)(e): “the bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, the bankruptcy 
… by gambling.”
108. See Bankruptcy Act, RSC 1927, c 11, s 143(e); see also Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo 5, 
c 59, s 26(3)(f ).
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attend treatment for their gambling as a condition of getting a discharge.109 
When viewed through the lens of the social context evidence presented in section 
I.B, it becomes evident that both of these outcomes are problematic.
Consider the case of Re Donaldson.110 A married couple, aged sixty-five 
and seventy-three, filed for bankruptcy. It was their fourth bankruptcy filing in 
thirty-six years. The three previous bankruptcies had been precipitated by job 
losses and business failures, but the fourth resulted from the couple “succumb[ing] 
to the siren’s call of the VLT [Video Lottery Terminal, a type of EGM], financed 
by credit cards and payday loans.”111 They did not receive an automatic discharge 
because they were fourth time bankrupts; instead they appeared before a judicial 
officer. At the hearing the judicial officer was precluded from granting an absolute 
discharge because gambling is a listed ground in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act. The judicial officer had to craft a discharge order that took account of the 
couple’s multiple bankruptcies and their gambling. The judicial officer imposed 
a number of conditions on the bankrupt couple’s discharge, including attending 
counselling for gambling and enrolling in a voluntary exclusion program.112 
Additionally, the judicial officer directed that the debtors would need to reapply 
for a discharge, but could only make such an application once they had complied 
with the conditions for a period of five years.113
The Donaldsons had their access to a discharge delayed, a fate suffered 
by many bankrupt gamblers. A trustee creates delays by opposing a debtor’s 
automatic discharge. Whenever a hearing is triggered, the debtor loses the benefit 
of an automatic discharge and will remain undischarged until, at the very earliest, 
a hearing is scheduled. This can extend a bankruptcy by a matter of weeks, 
or more often months. At the hearing, the judicial officer may grant an absolute 
discharge, or further delay the debt relief by suspending the discharge to a future 
date or imposing conditions on the debtor.114
Delaying a bankrupt’s discharge has serious, potentially negative consequences 
for a bankrupt because undischarged bankrupts are subject to many restrictions. 
109. See Lund, “Gambling Debt,” supra note 7 at 549-53, 557-58. Additionally, trustees may use 
the threat of an opposition to compel an individual to attend treatment.
110. 2019 NSSC 33.
111. Ibid at para 13. 
112. See ibid at para 32. 
113. See ibid.
114. See Lund, “Gambling Debt,” supra note 7 at 556-58 (summarizing the range of suspensions 
and conditions imposed on bankrupt gamblers). 
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They may have difficulty accessing credit.115 Any property acquired while still a 
bankrupt becomes the property of the individual’s estate and will be used by the 
trustee to pay off the creditors. For example, if an individual inherited money 
while still an undischarged bankrupt, that money must be paid to the trustee.116 
Undischarged bankrupts are barred from holding certain offices or working in 
certain jobs. For example, some jurisdictions prevent them from acting as directors 
of corporations,117 or from holding some types of licences, such as an insurance 
agent’s licence.118 Being an undischarged bankrupt can prevent an individual 
from sponsoring family or friends who wish to immigrate to Canada.119 While 
awaiting a discharge, individuals are denied the emotional reprieve of having 
their debts forgiven.120 Keeping gamblers in bankruptcy past their automatic 
discharge date exposes them to all these potentially negative consequences for a 
longer period of time.
This differential treatment of gamblers who go bankrupt is problematic given 
the changing social context of bankruptcy. The provision in the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act that singles out gamblers for harsh treatment dates back to a time 
when most forms of gambling were criminal and gambling was viewed as a vice, 
whereas now governments market gambling as a legal form of entertainment. 
Given this shifting social context, it is difficult to justify treating a bankrupt 
who spends money gambling differently from a bankrupt who spends money 
115. Undischarged bankrupts are required to disclose their status when applying for credit and 
face penalties under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act if they fail to do so. See BIA, supra 
note 91, s 199. 
116. An inheritance received during bankruptcy is treated as property of the bankrupt estate as 
opposed to income of the bankrupt individual, the latter of which would be subject to the 
surplus income regime. See ibid, ss 67(1)(c), 68(2). 
117. See Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 105(1)(d). See also Business 
Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16, s 118(1)(4). See also Business Corporations Act, RSA 
2000, c B-9, s 105(1)(d). 
118. See Insurance Agents and Adjusters Regulation, AR 122/2001, s 5(1)(e). 
119. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR 2002-227, s 133(1)(i). 
120. See Margaret Howard, “A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy” (1987) 48 Ohio 
St LJ 1047 at 1060-61. Howard discusses how bankruptcy both provides emotional relief (by 
discharging debts) and is stigmatizing (because of the negative associations with bankruptcy). 
In the Canadian context, once a person has made an assignment into bankruptcy they have 
incurred the stigma of being bankrupt. The longer they remain in bankruptcy without a 
discharge, they are subjected to stigma of being bankrupt, but without the emotional reprieve 
of debt relief.
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on other legal pursuits, such as playing golf.121 Yet, bankruptcy law continues to 
treat gamblers as though they have committed a bad act, a fact which becomes 
evident when one asks what role gambling as a medical condition plays in the 
bankruptcy process.
Recall that a medical condition can be used to excuse culpable behaviour 
or secure access to an entitlement. Having a gambling disorder or other 
medical condition is not a prerequisite to getting a discharge, and therefore 
the question before judicial officers in cases like Re Donaldson is not about a 
medically-contingent entitlement. One might assume that a gambling disorder 
operated as an excuse in the discharge process. According to this line of reasoning, 
the debtors have committed an act which the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 
identifies as blameworthy (i.e., gambling) and so the debtors are not entitled to a 
discharge unless they can show that their bad conduct should be excused because 
they engaged in it as the result of a medical condition (i.e., a gambling disorder). 
But this line of reasoning requires one to accept that gambling constitutes 
bad behaviour, a conclusion that sits on shaky ground given that provincial 
governments across Canada promote gambling as a legitimate form of leisure.
A slightly different argument is that the culpable behavior in question is 
gambling to the point of insolvency. But again, it is unclear what basis exists for 
treating the individual who gambled beyond their means differently from the 
individual who overspent on a different legal pursuit. Canadian bankruptcy legal 
academic Roderick Wood has observed that the debt relief available in bankruptcy 
is no longer restricted to the honest, unfortunate debtor who suffers setbacks due 
to “external factors over which the debtor has no control.”122 Debt relief is also 
available to “individuals whose financial distress is attributable to poor financial 
management.”123 Treating individuals who have gambled beyond their means 
differently from other over spenders can only be justified with reference to a 
moral view of gambling as bad, a view that is inconsistent with the federal and 
provincial governments’ permissive regulatory approach to gambling.
It can even be argued that we should treat the gambler more leniently 
than other bankrupts. Governments across Canada use gambling as a source 
of public revenue even though, by making gambling more accessible, they 
121. See Fast v PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc, 2010 SKQB 217 (CanLII) at 8 (arguing that gambling 
should be treated the same as golfing). Master Farrington adopted this approach in Re 
Mukadem, 2019 ABQB 113 at para 11. She reasoned that she would consider gambling 
only in the context of whether or not there were any concerns about the debtor’s lifestyle 
being “extravagant.”
122. Wood, supra note 102 at 297.
123. Ibid. 
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create an environment that is conducive to disordered gambling. A principle 
in tort law is that a person will be held responsible if they introduce a risky, but 
profitable, activity into the public realm and the risk manifests itself causing 
harm.124 Governments may someday be held liable for their role in conducting 
and managing gambling,125 but even absent a finding of liability, the fact they 
are actively involved in the promotion of gambling should inform how gamblers 
are treated in the bankruptcy system. Tort law reflects a basic idea about fairness: 
that if we collectively derive a financial benefit from the governments’ gambling 
ventures, we have a collective responsibility to support the individuals who are 
harmed by those ventures, including those individuals who develop gambling 
disorders. But instead of supporting problem gamblers as they re-establish 
themselves, legal actors can use the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to impede 
problem gamblers from accessing debt relief—debt relief that is readily available 
to other Canadians. The bankrupt’s medical condition operates as neither an 
excuse nor a pre-requisite to an entitlement, but rather a rationale for adverse 
treatment. Yet, this effect is masked by the language of the medical model, which 
portrays the differential treatment as a beneficial, therapeutic intervention.
Trustees and judicial officers can comply with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Act and still prevent gamblers from facing delays in the discharge process. 
Trustees are not required to oppose the discharge of an individual who has 
gambled, and absent an opposition from a trustee, most bankrupts will receive 
an automatic discharge. Once a discharge hearing is triggered, judicial officers 
are precluded from granting a gambler an absolute discharge order, but they can 
provide the gambler with ready debt relief by granting a discharge with a nominal 
suspension. By shifting their practices in these ways, trustees and judicial officers 
can ensure that bankruptcy law is responsive to the social context of financially 
distressed gamblers.
A second potential harm that gamblers may experience when they go 
bankrupt is that they may be compelled to undergo treatments against their 
wishes. In Re Donaldson, the judicial officer made the discharge conditional on 
the bankrupts attending gambling counselling, despite the husband indicating 
that he had tried counselling already and not found it useful.126 Compulsory 
124. See Lewis N Klar & Cameron SG Jefferies, Tort Law, 6th ed (Thomson Reuters Canada, 
2017) at 233-38.
125. See Rob Simpson, Erika Chamberlain & Garry Smith, “When Should Casinos Owe a Duty 
of Care Toward Their Patrons” (2019) 56 Alta L Rev 963 (arguing that gambling providers 
should be subject to liability as commercial hosts).
126. See Re Donaldson, supra note 110 at paras 15 & 32.
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treatment is inconsistent with a fundamental principle of health care, that 
individuals should only receive medical treatment after giving their informed 
consent.127 Speaking about compelled addiction treatment generally, the American 
bioethicist Arthur Caplan suggests that this departure from requiring informed 
consent can be justified if the result is to restore an individual’s autonomy by 
ridding them of the addiction.128 When interviewed, some trustees indicated that 
they were motivated to impose treatments on bankrupts because they believed 
that mandatory treatments would help the bankrupts overcome their gambling 
disorders.129 But even the most effective treatments for disordered gambling 
have limited success rates, meaning the most that a gambler can be promised 
is the possibility that their condition might improve. Moreover, little research 
exists on whether forcing a person into treatment inhibits the effectiveness of 
the treatment.130 One possibility is that forcing individuals to attend treatment 
undermines their sense of self-efficacy because it reinforces the idea that they 
require expert intervention to overcome their addiction.131 In fact, many people 
overcome gambling problems without any outside intervention.132 Individuals 
with strong feelings of self-efficacy are more likely to overcome their addiction.133 
127. See T Cameron Wild, “Social Control and Coercion in Addiction Treatment: Towards 
Evidence Based Policy & Practice” (2006) 101 Addiction 40 at 46.
128. See Caplan, supra note 35 at 1920.
129. See Lund, “Gambling Debt,” supra note 7 at 550. 
130. See T Cameron Wild, Jody Wolfe & Elaine Hyshka, “Consent and Coercion in Addition 
Treatment” in Adrian Carter, Wayne Hall & Judy Illes, eds, Addiction Neuroethics: The Ethics 
of Addiction Neuroscience Research and Treatment (Elsevier, 2012) 153 at 161.
131. Stanton Peele, The Meaning of Addiction: Compulsive Experience and Its Interpretation (DC 
Heath, 1985) at 143-44. 
132. Hyoun Kim et al, “When do gamblers help themselves? Self-discontinuity increases 
self-directed change over time” (2017) 64 Addictive Behav 148 (exploring the factors that 
motivate an individual to undertake self-directed change); Jennifer Swan & David Hodgins, 
“Brief Interventions for Disordered Gambling” (2015) 6 Can J Addiction 29 at 29-30; 
Wendy S Slutske, “Natural recovery and treatment-seeking in pathological gambling: Results 
of two U.S. National Surveys” (2006) 163 Am J Psychiatry 297; Nerilee Hing, Elaine Nuske 
& Sally Gainsbury, “Gamblers at-risk and their help-seeking behaviour” (2011) online: New 
South Wales Office of Responsible Gambling <www.responsiblegambling.nsw.gov.au/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0019/225802/Gamblers-at-risk-and-their-help-seeking-behaviour.pdf> at 
300 (arguing that self-help strategies are “widely used” by gamblers); David Hodgins & 
Nady el-Guebaly, “Natural and Treatment Assisted Recovery from Gambling Problems: 
A comparison of Resolved and Active Gamblers” (2000) 95 Addiction 777 at 787 (finding 
that self-recovery is more common amongst gamblers with less severe problems, whereas 
those with more severe problems may require outside intervention).
133. Igor Yakovenko & David C Hodgins, “Effectiveness of a Voluntary Casino Self-Exclusion 
Online Self-Management Program” (2017) [unpublished, available from author].
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Thus, we should be slow to adopt practices—such as compulsory treatment—
that might erode these feelings of self-efficacy and hurt a person’s chances of 
recovery.  Given what we know—and what we do not know—about compulsory 
treatment, trustees and judicial officers should be reticent to impose therapeutic 
interventions on problem gamblers.
Trustees and judicial officers may be concerned that, absent treatment, 
gamblers will continue to gamble, triggering additional bankruptcies. Recidivism 
is a legitimate concern: bankruptcy is supposed to provide a fresh start for people 
who encounter unexpected financial disruptions, but there is a risk that individuals 
may use it strategically and repeatedly to avoid their financial obligations.134 
Thomas Telfer’s research on repeat bankrupts suggests that gambling is not a 
common cause of bankruptcy recidivism—it is cited as the primary cause of 
bankruptcy in about 1 per cent of repeat bankruptcies, which is similar to how 
often gambling is cited as the primary cause by first time bankrupts.135 These 
numbers likely underreport how frequently gambling leads to bankruptcy and 
yet also suggest that bankruptcy recidivism is primarily driven by other causes 
such as overspending, poverty, and illness.136 Moreover, the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act contains rules that are intended to discourage strategic recidivism. 
Second-time bankrupts must wait longer than first-timers before getting 
an automatic discharge.137 Third-time bankrupts have no entitlement to an 
automatic discharge, and instead, must appear at a discharge hearing.138 Where 
individuals repeatedly gamble their way into bankruptcy, these rules can address 
their recidivism once it occurs.
Trustees and judicial officers do not need to turn a blind eye to an 
individual’s gambling. There is scope within the bankruptcy system for trustees, 
134. Thomas Telfer notes that bankruptcy creates a moral hazard, because individuals may incur 
debts with no intention of repaying the debt, but rather an intention to discharge them in 
bankruptcy. The censure of repeat bankrupts aims to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy 
system by lessening this moral hazard. See Thomas Telfer, “Repeat Bankruptcies and the 
Integrity of the Canadian Bankruptcy Process” (2014) 55 Can Bus LJ 231 at 241-45.
135. See ibid at Table 1:
Year 2010 2011 2012
Percentage of Bankrupts Listing Gambling as 
Cause of Bankruptcy 0.75% 0.68% 0.71%
Percentage of Repeat Bankrupts Listing 
Gambling as Cause of Bankruptcy 1.10% 0.94% 0.97%
136. See ibid.
137. See BIA, supra note 91, s 168.1(1)(b).
138. See ibid, s 169. 
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especially, to help. A bankruptcy proceeding can be a negative shock that primes 
individuals to make changes in their lives.139 A trustee can provide an individual 
with information or referrals to gambling support services.140 During the 
mandatory financial counselling sessions, the person carrying out the counselling 
might help a debtor to strategize about how the debtor plans to address their 
problem gambling. If an individual wants to undertake treatment and believes 
that making their discharge contingent on fulfilling treatment will help them 
remain committed to recovery, a bankrupt should be allowed to consent to the 
imposition of a conditional order as a form of commitment device.141 Absent such 
consent, trustees and judicial officers should neither delay a bankrupt gambler’s 
discharge nor impose compulsory gambling treatment on them.
The social context evidence about gambling highlights an additional reason 
to be concerned about the delays and compelled treatment experienced by 
bankrupt gamblers. Members of marginalized groups are more likely to develop 
diagnosable gambling disorders, and therefore are more likely to have their access 
to a discharge delayed and to be subject to compulsory treatment. Research on 
other legal initiatives that use the force of law to impose treatment on addicted 
individuals has suggested that “minority groups appear to be disproportionately 
represented” in these programs.142 Reflecting on this feature of mandatory 
treatment programs, the American social worker and academic Thomas O’Hare 
noted that the practitioners involved in these programs “may be unintentionally 
participating in a system that at best provides a more human diversion from 
punishment or at worst colludes with an oppressive social structure.”143 The 
possibility that already marginalized groups may be disproportionately harmed 
by how legal actors are practicing bankruptcy law is a compelling reason to shift 
those practices.
139. See Langham et al, supra note 3 at 7.
140. See Hing, Nuske & Gainsbury, supra note 132 at 299.
141. See Lund & Shah, supra note 11 at 358. See also Robert E Scott, “Error and Rationality in 
Individual Decision-making: An Essay on the Relationship between Cognitive Illusions and 
the Management of Choices” (1986) 59 S Cal L Rev 329 at 352 (discussing commitment 
devices more generally).
142. Christine MJ Snyder & Stephen A Anderson, “An Examination of Mandated versus 
Voluntary Referral as a Determinant of Clinical Outcome” (2009) 35 J Marital & Family 
Therapy 278 at 279. See also Thomas O’Hare, “Court-Ordered versus Voluntary Clients: 
Problem Difference and Readiness for Change” (1996) 41 Soc Work 417 at 421 (discussing 
treatment providers’ potential participation in oppressive social structures).
143. O’Hare, ibid at 421.
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C. WHEN GAMBLING HAS CONTRIBUTED TO AN  
ADDITIONAL CULPABLE ACT
The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act creates hurdles for gamblers who go bankrupt, 
but gambling can be relevant in a second scenario: when an individual has 
engaged in activities which otherwise would be considered culpable and claims 
that a gambling problem drove them to misbehave.144 For example, in Re Duong, 
the bankrupt falsified information on a credit application and then gambled away 
the borrowed money.145 In Re Elkareh, the bankrupt raised money for gambling 
by purchasing goods on credit and reselling them, for cash, at a discounted price, 
to a gentleman the bankrupt met at a casino.146 Canadian bankruptcy law takes 
these forms of misconduct seriously. A person who lies to get credit or resells 
goods purchased on credit may be convicted of an offence under the Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Act or the Criminal Code.147 Additionally, they may be denied 
access to a discharge, or a court may stipulate that the bankrupt’s obligation to 
repay the fraudulently obtained loans or the cost of the resold goods survives, 
notwithstanding a discharge.148
When insolvency trustees and bankruptcy courts are asked to judge the 
deservingness of these individuals under the current medical model of bankruptcy, 
they may be willing to excuse the debtor’s bad behaviour if they are satisfied that the 
debtor was acting under the compulsive force of an addiction. They will exempt 
the individual from the normal consequences of their actions if the individual 
identifies as sick and seeks treatment.149 An insolvency trustee or judge may seek 
expert corroboration of the illness to guard against malingering. An individual 
who does not seek treatment, or who cannot provide expert corroboration of 
their addiction may find they are not exempted from responsibility. For example, 
in the case Re Hosseini, the bankrupt had engaged in misconduct, which resulted 
144. Individuals with gambling disorders may engage in criminal activity to raise funds to gamble. 
See Langham et al, supra note 3 at 11. 
145. See Re Duong, 2006 CanLII 30589 (Ont Sup Ct) at para 9.
146. See Re Elkareh, 2007 CanLII 15235 (Ont Sup Ct) at para 4. See also Re Nadarajah, 2014 
ONSC 176 at para 11; Re Ismail, 2007 CanLII 3883 (Ont Sup Ct) at paras 4-5.
147. See BIA, supra note 91, s 198(1)(e), (g). The maximum fine is ten thousand dollars and the 
maximum period of imprisonment is three years. See Criminal Code, supra note 30, s 380. 
See e.g., Re Nadarajah, supra note 146 at para 6. For a discussion of the offences in the 
BIA, see John D Honsberger & Vern W DaRe, Honsberger’s Bankruptcy in Canada, 5th ed 
(Thomson Reuters, 2017) at ch 28.
148. See BIA, ibid, ss 173(1)(k), 178(1)(e); Re Nadarajah, supra note 147 at para 112. 
149. See Parsons, supra note 29.
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in an RCMP investigation, charges, and a guilty plea to one bankruptcy offence.150 
At a subsequent discharge hearing, the bankrupt claimed gambling caused his 
financial woes, but the judicial officer rejected this excuse:151
The only explanation offered at the hearing by the Bankrupt for his conduct was 
that he was under pressure, and sick. No evidence was proffered of any medically 
diagnosed illness, or of any course of treatment for any illness. I do not accept 
this evidence.
The question of whether or not Mr. Hosseini’s misconduct was attributable 
to the illness was subsumed in the question of whether or not he was truly “sick.” 
This case illustrates how the medical model can support binary thinking that 
distinguishes between “sick” problem gamblers and “bad” recreational gamblers, 
where individuals who fall into the former category are excused from responsibility 
and those falling into the latter are not.
This binary approach to culpability creates two problems for gamblers. 
First, it privileges individuals who can secure a medical diagnosis and complete 
a course of treatment. Although individuals from socially marginalized groups 
are more likely to develop diagnosable gambling problems, they may struggle to 
elicit the evidence needed to prove their medical disorders in court. When they 
attempt to access medical care, they face barriers including the cost of care (if not 
covered by a public health care plan), the cost of transportation to attend at a 
health care centre, and lack of information about available services.152 Moreover, 
the care they receive may be tinged by the negative stereotypes that health care 
professionals hold regarding socially marginalized groups.153 These barriers 
impede socially marginalized gamblers from securing the evidence necessary to 
satisfy the court that they have a verifiable medical condition and that they have 
taken genuine steps to address it. Under a binary medical model, they risk being 
labelled as a bad gambler, instead of a sick one.
The second problem with the binary medical model is that it masks the 
role that social context plays in fostering gambling and related misconduct. 
Under the binary model a gambler is either sick or bad, whereas a legal actor who 
examines an individual’s social context can take a nuanced approach to assessing 
150. See Re Hosseini, 2008 CanLII 56008 (Ont Sup Ct) at paras 4-5. 
151. Ibid at para 13.
152. Deanna L Williamson et al, “Low Income Canadians Experiences with Health Related 
Services: Implications for Healthcare Reform” (2006) 76 Health Pol’y 106 at 113-15. 
153. See ibid at 118. 
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the individual’s deservingness allowing for degrees of culpability.154 A trustee’s 
or judicial officer’s assessment of a bankrupt’s culpability informs the terms on 
which that bankrupt can access debt relief. Therefore, whether these legal actors 
consider an individual’s social context has significant, real world implications for 
the individual, including the possibility of a delayed discharge and the associated 
negative consequences discussed in section II.B.
The complex interaction of social context and personal culpability can 
be illustrated with a vignette. Imagine two recently widowed seniors are both 
struggling to acclimate to the loss of their respective spouses.155 One lives in 
the country. She attends a weekly bingo night with friends from church.156 The 
outings are primarily social. Sometimes she wins money, mostly she loses, but 
because the gambling only lasts for a few hours, once a week, her losses are 
limited. The second widow lives at a retirement home in a city, near a casino. 
The casino regularly buses seniors in for an afternoon of gambling. She initially 
attends the outings with friends and starts playing the slot machines.157 She 
finds that playing the machines numbs the pain of her loss. Because the casino is 
nearby and open for most of the day, the second widow can play slot machines 
whenever she wants, for hours at a time. The second widow lives on a modest 
pension and quickly runs out of cash, but there are other options available to 
fund her play. Perhaps she attends at a financial institution and is assisted by a 
lending agent, who encourages her to stretch the truth a little when filling out the 
credit application. (The lending agent recognizes that the widow is unlikely to be 
approved on the basis of an accurate application, and the lending agent is under 
154. Yvana LBH Mols, “Bankruptcy Stigma and Vulnerability: Questioning Autonomy and 
Structuring Resilience” (2012) 29 Emory Bankr Dev J 289 at 322-23. 
155. See Re Teatro, 2009 CanLII 14395 (Ont Sup Ct), in which the bankrupt had started 
gambling after separating from his wife. The judicial officer noted, “He found it a way to fill 
the void left in his life. The end of a marriage has often been likened to a death in terms of 
the hole it leaves in one’s life” (ibid at para 6).
156. Reporting the bingo players tend to be female, see Volberg & Wray, supra note 37 at 65; 
Volberg, “Feminization of Gambling,” supra note 55 at 12.
157. Finding that slot machine players tend to be older and female, see Petry, supra note 65 at 
652; see also Urbanoski & Rush, supra note 65 at Table 5. 
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considerable pressure to meet a sales quota.158) Or perhaps, like Mr. Elkareh, 
a charming stranger approaches the widow at the casino and offers to buy goods 
from her for cash, after she purchases them on credit.
Both widows undergo the same, very human experience of losing a loved 
one; both are exposed to gambling opportunities; but only one copes with her loss 
through excessive gambling. In the first widow’s case, her social context protects 
her against excessive gambling and resulting misfeasance; in the second widow’s 
case, her social context contributes to it. The second widow has ready access 
to a highly addictive form of gambling (and her descent into gambling-related 
debt has been facilitated by problematic lending practices – though that is a 
topic for another article).159 Approaching the question of the second widow’s 
responsibility using the framework of the sick role oversimplifies the narrative. 
The role of social context is obscured and the second widow is either culpable (or 
not) depending on whether she can establish that she was truly sick. A nuanced 
approach to the question of culpability would allow space for more shades of 
responsibility and exculpation.
When called on to assess the culpability of gamblers who have misbehaved, 
insolvency trustees and judicial officers may wish to consider how the gambler’s 
choices have been constrained by their environment. They may wish to pay 
particular attention to how an individual’s social context either insulates an 
individual against harm or burdens them with increased exposure. For example, 
the accessibility and format of gambling that the provincial government made 
available to the second widow made her particularly susceptible to gambling to 
excess. Her modest income meant that she quickly ran into financial difficulty 
as a result of her gambling losses. These social context factors may not entirely 
excuse the widow’s dishonest behaviour, but they mitigate her responsibility. 
The trustee administering the second widow’s bankruptcy may point to the social 
158. In an investigation carried out by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the journalists 
heard from employees at the five major Canadian banks who “feel pressured to upsell, trick 
and even lie to customers to meet unrealistic sales targets and keep their jobs.” See Erica 
Johnson, “‘We Are All Doing It’: Employees at Canada’s 5 Big Banks Speak Out about 
Pressure to Dupe Customers” (15 March 2017), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news/
business/banks-upselling-go-public-1.4023575>. In Re Nadarajah, supra note 146 at para 
90, the court noted that “numerous credit card companies granted [the bankrupt] numerous 
cards with significant available amounts.” 
159. On responsible lending, see Micheline Gleixner, “Financial Literacy, Responsible Lending 
and the Prevention of Personal Insolvency” in Janis Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency 
Law 2013 (Carswell, 2014); Jacob Ziegel, Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes—A 
Canadian Perspective (Hart, 2003) at 150-51. 
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context factors as justifying a less onerous discharge order, and the judicial officer 
may likewise adopt these factors as rationale when granting such an order.
The social context of the gambler operates in a similar manner to the diagnosis 
of a gambling disorder in Parson’s sick role in the sense that both exculpate the 
individual from responsibility, but the social context approach has a number of 
advantages over the medical one. The social context approach does not place as 
much weight on a person being diagnosed with a disorder and seeking treatment, 
which can disadvantage already socially marginalized individuals who may have 
difficulty accessing health services. Moreover, by de-emphasizing the role of 
medical experts, the social context approach can empower gambling bankrupts, 
because they are not told they require medical experts to identify or treat their 
problems. This message may bolster their feelings of self-efficacy and thereby 
support the natural recovery process. The medical approach invites binary 
thinking about sick individuals, who have no control over their own actions, and 
others who are not sick and are thus inexcusably bad. The social context approach 
invites more nuanced thinking because it recognizes that individuals are exercising 
their autonomy, but doing so in constrained circumstances. Of course, these 
benefits to the social context approach will be lost if one’s environment is treated 
as being entirely deterministic of one’s behaviour. Such a turn in reasoning would 
invite a new, binary approach to responsibility and disempower individuals by 
giving them the message that they are powerless in the face of their environment.
III. SOCIAL CONTEXT EDUCATION AS A FIRST STEP 
TOWARDS CHANGE
Helpfulness is generally considered to be a positive character trait. The medical 
model engenders helpful interventions aimed at treating individual malfunction, 
and one might embrace the medical model because it fosters this helpful orientation. 
The title of this article, “Help is the Sunny Side of Control,” reminds readers that 
helpfulness is complicated. Over the past century, excessive gambling has been 
reconceptualised as a medical problem. When gamblers go bankrupt, the trustees 
and judicial officers involved in their cases may adopt a therapeutic approach to 
the gambler: they may try to help. This medically-justified helpfulness can go 
astray. The medical model invites paternalistic interventions and legal actors may 
justify potentially harmful “help” in medical terms. The medical model focuses 
attention on the individual, which can obscure an individual’s social context. This 
can lead to legal actors unfairly attributing blame to individuals and perpetuating 
social inequality. When legal actors in the bankruptcy system adopt a medical 
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model of gambling, individuals experience a range of harms: delayed discharges, 
compulsory treatment, and overly narrow assessments of their culpability.
Individuals working as insolvency trustees describe the ability to help 
others as one of the best, and most rewarding, parts of their job.160 It would be 
unfortunate and more than a little unfair to recast this helping impulse in an 
entirely negative light. Help can be the sunny side of control, but trustees and 
judicial officers can also implement bankruptcy law in a manner that reflects 
the complex interplay of social context and individual responsibility, and that 
builds resilience while avoiding paternalistic interventions. In other words, they 
can offer help that is less likely to cause harm. But doing so requires them to 
understand the social context that their clients inhabit. In particular, it may be 
important to educate trustees and judicial officers about how the accessibility of 
gambling and the social marginality of gamblers affects which people develop 
a diagnosable gambling disorder. One aim of this article has been to educate 
trustees and judicial officers about these topics.
This article fits into a larger movement in Canadian law that aims to 
incorporate social context evidence into how legal actors apply the law.161 
Whether they do so consciously or not, legal actors draw on their own attitudes 
and beliefs about how the world works when passing judgment on others, 
including bankrupt individuals.162 When uncritically relied on, these attitudes 
160. Lund, Trustees at Work, supra note 96. 
161. In Canada, we have at least thirty years of experience in providing judges with social 
context education, and there are many lessons that can be drawn from that experience and 
usefully applied to providing social context education to other legal actors. See e.g., T Brettel 
Dawson, “Judicial Education on Social Context and Gender in Canada: Principles, Process 
and Lessons Learned” (2014) 21 Intl J Leg Prof 259; Hon Brian W Lennon & Natalie 
Williams, “Social Context and Judicial Education in Canada” (2013) 1 J Intl Org for 
Judicial Training 31; Hon John F McGarry, “The Social Context Initiative: Comprehensive, 
In-Depth and Credible” in 20th Anniversary Essays (Ottawa: National Judicial Institute, 
2009) n.p., online: National Judicial Institute <www.nji.ca/nji/UserFiles/File/NJI_20th_
Anniversary_Essays_--_A_Collection.pdf>. See also Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “Re-Defining the 
Role of the Canadian Judiciary in Bankruptcies and Receiverships” (2005) 20 BFLR 241 
at 251-52 (calling for social context education for bankruptcy judges). Legal scholars have 
offered articulate arguments in favour of using social context evidence in very different legal 
areas as well. See, for instance, Reem Bahdi, “Arabs, Muslims, Human Rights, Access to 
Justice and Institutional Trustworthiness: Insights from Thirteen Legal Narratives” (2018) 96 
Can Bar Rev 72. 
162. See Emma Cunliffe, “Judging, Fast and Slow: Using Decision-Making Theory to Explore 
Judicial Fact Determination” (2014) 18 Intl J Evidence & Proof 139 at 146; Lynn Smith, 
“Judicial Education On Context” (2005) 38 UBC L Rev 569 at 570. See also Richard 
Devlin, “Jurisprudence for Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters for Social Context Education” 
(2001) 27 Queen’s LJ 161 at 168. Devlin opines that “every act of judgment takes place in 
the context of a larger set” of unarticulated “practices and conventions.”
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and beliefs may “reinforce established patterns of discrimination … [and] 
perpetuate inequality.”163 When it comes to problem gamblers, these attitudes 
and beliefs may obscure the social context in which gamblers operate, and recast 
the effect of environmental constraints as being entirely matters of personal choice 
or responsibility. Social context education provides trustees and judicial officers 
with information about the systemic disadvantages faced by some individuals, 
and how those disadvantages may manifest as gambling problems. Trustees and 
judicial officers are then better positioned to identify their embedded biases and 
to understand how these biases shape their assessments of culpability.164 In other 
words, they learn to scrutinize their reflexive, intuitive judgements.165
Social context education must do more than just teach insolvency trustees 
and judicial officers about the social factors that might lead some individuals to 
gamble excessively; it must also help insolvency trustees and judicial officers to 
recognize how some individuals may come to be scrutinized for their gambling—
and related misconduct—more than others.166 The social context education of 
insolvency trustees and judicial officers should include training on how the law 
can be selective in a consistently patterned way that over-polices “marginalized 
people whose disadvantage becomes a reason to view them as suspicious, 
dangerous, and in need of containment.”167 Gambling laws have historically been 
applied so as to perpetuate the marginalization of some groups.168 Social context 
education can help trustees and judicial officers avoid perpetuating this legacy by 
making them aware of this historical dynamic as well as contemporary realities 
including a higher prevalence rate of diagnosable gambling disorders amongst 
socially marginalized groups.
This article has argued that social context education may be particularly 
important for addressing the drawbacks of the medical model. This article uses 
personal bankruptcy law to illustrate the drawbacks of the medical model and 
the relevance of social context evidence to the everyday practice of bankruptcy 
law. It is intended to help guide the practices of legal actors who play a role in 
the bankruptcy system, but also individuals involved in other areas of law. Illness 
is used as an excuse, as a pre-requisite to entitlements, and as a justification for 
163. Kathleen Mahoney, “Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge” (2015) J Disp Resol 43 at 46. 
164. See Smith, supra note 162 at 575.
165. See Dawson, supra note 161 at 260.
166. See Sonia N Lawrence & Toni Williams, “Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of 
Canadian Sentencing” (2006) 56 UTLJ 285. 
167. Ibid at 295. 
168. See Morton, supra note 57 at 120-24 and text accompanying to note 90; Tepperman et al, 
supra note 44 at 209.
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increased social control in many areas of law. Legal actors must think through 
how they use the medical model and social context evidence in each of these 
areas. Consider gamblers. An individual’s gambling may bring them into contact 
with criminal law, as some individuals engage in criminal activity to fund their 
gambling.169 Lenders who provide consumer loans may find themselves seeking 
to collect gambling-related debt.170 A spouse’s gambling may have repercussions 
for how the family’s assets are divided upon the breakdown of a marriage.171 
An employer will need to determine the scope of its duty to accommodate when 
a wayward employee admits to having a gambling disorder.172 In each of these 
areas, parties may contest whether gambling should be characterized as a moral or 
medical problem. The medical characterization is viewed as the more progressive 
option, yet by mapping some of the risks posed by the medical model, this article 
highlights the need to proceed cautiously and the value of incorporating social 
context evidence.
Studying how the law has responded and can respond to the medicalization of 
gambling is important for a second reason: gambling is only the first compulsive 
behaviour to be characterized as an addiction. Others have been and likely will 
be added to the list. In 2018, the World Health Organization recognized gaming 
disorder—“persistent or recurrent” video gaming—as a form of behavioural 
addiction.173 Other behaviours, including shopping, sex and eating, are in 
the process of being recast as medical problems when done compulsively.174 
Of particular interest to actors in the bankruptcy system is the move towards 
medicalizing financial behaviours, including “compulsive buying disorder, … 
financial denial, financial dependence, financial enmeshment, financial enabling, 
and financial infidelity.”175 Bankruptcy law and the broader legal system will 
be called on to adjudicate disputes where the medical characterization of these 
169. See Derek Spencer, “Judicial Recognition of Gambling Addiction” (Poster Presentation, 
delivered at the Alberta Gambling Research Institute Annual Conference, Banff, AB, 
29 March 2019) [unpublished]; Garry Smith & Harold Wynne, Gambling and Crime in 
Western Canada (Canada West Foundation, 1999) at 14; Langham et al, supra note 3 at 11.
170. See e.g., Amex Bank of Canada v. Johnson, 2007 ABPC 130.
171. See e.g., Vitug v Vitug, 2013 BCSC 405.
172. See BC Public Service, supra note 31.
173. See World Health Organization, “ICD-11 for Mortality and Morbidity Statistics,”  
s 6C51 (December 2018), online: <icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#http%3a%2f%2fid.who.
int%2ficd%2fentity%2f1448597234>.
174. See Piquet Pessoa et al, Meule & Gearhardt, and Farré et al, supra note 13.
175. Anthony Canale, Kristy L Archuleta & Bradly T Klontz, “Money Disorders” in Bradley T 
Klontz, Sonya L Britt & Kristy L Archuleta, eds, Financial Therapy: Theory, Research and 
Practice (Springer International, 2015) 35 at 36.
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behaviours bears on the proper resolution of the dispute. This article unpacks 
the theoretical issues raised by the characterization of excessive gambling as a 
medical problem and illustrates how these theoretical issues connect to practical, 
everyday legal questions that arise in bankruptcy law. It models how to think 
through the questions that will arise about the medicalization of gambling in 
other areas of law and the medicalization of other compulsive behaviours. This 
article demonstrates how to think through these questions.
Social context education for actors in the bankruptcy system does little to 
address shortcomings in the current regulatory approaches to gambling across 
Canada, but it can be an impetus for more radical shifts in the law. There are 
political and policy implications to using social context evidence to address the 
drawbacks of the medical model. Dutch sociologist Abram De Swaan argues 
that the popularity of the medical model may partly stem from its ability to 
individualize problems, and thereby preclude systemic critique and change.176 
American sociologists Joseph Schneider and Peter Conrad add that the medical 
model hampers social critique by removing issues, such as excessive gambling, 
from the realm of public discussion, instead making them matters for medical 
experts to manage on a case-by-case basis.177 Reintroducing social context evidence 
as an important consideration in the legal system supports, by implication, 
political critique and policy-making that take a similar social context approach. 
It creates more space for public debate about whether we are doing enough in 
Canada to regulate gambling and to respond to gambling-related harm. Likewise, 
adopting a social context approach in other areas of law, where the medical 
model is ascendant, can spark new conversations about what role law can play in 
addressing systemic inequality.
176. See Abram De Swaan, “Expansion and Limitation of the Medical Regime” in The 
Management of Normality (Routledge, 1990) 57 at 69. 
177. See Conrad & Schneider, supra note 14 at 249. Fiona Nicoll argues that this 
individualization of gambling is pervasive in the way gambling and gamblers are “researched 
and regulated in isolation from the social environments within which cultural meaning and 
practices of gambling are forged.” See Nicoll, supra note 34 at 218. 
